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Abstract
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are lightweight hardware security primitives
that are used to authenticate devices or generate cryptographic keys without using
non-volatile memories. This is accomplished by harvesting the inherent randomness
in manufacturing process variations (e.g. path delays) to generate random yet unique
outputs. A multiplexer (MUX) based arbiter PUF comprises two parallel delay chains
with MUXs as switching elements. An input to a PUF is called a challenge vector
and comprises of the select bits of all the MUX elements in the circuit. The output-
bits are referred to as responses. In other words, when queried with a challenge, the
PUF generates a response based on the uncontrollable physical characteristics of the
underlying PUF hardware. Thus, the overall path delays of these delay chains are
random and unique functions of the challenge.
The contributions in this thesis can be classified into four main ideas. First, a novel
approach to estimate delay differences of each stage in MUX-based standard arbiter
PUFs, feed-forward PUFs (FF PUFs) and modified feed-forward PUFs (MFF PUFs) is
presented. Test data collected from PUFs fabricated using 32 nm process are used to
learn models that characterize the PUFs. The delay differences of individual stages of
arbiter PUFs correspond to the model parameters. This was accomplished by employing
the least mean squares (LMS) adaptive algorithm. The models trained to learn the
parameters of two standard arbiter PUF-chips were able to predict responses with 97.5%
and 99.5% accuracy, respectively. Additionally, it was observed that perceptrons can
be used to attain 100% (approx.) prediction accuracy. A comparison shows that the
perceptron model parameters are scaled versions of the model derived by the LMS
algorithm. Since the delay differences are challenge independent, these parameters can
be stored on the server which enables the server to issue random challenges whose
responses need not be stored. By extending this analysis to 96 standard arbiter PUFs,
we confirm that the delay differences of each MUX stage of the PUFs follow a Gaussian
probability distribution.
Second, artificial neural network (ANN) models are trained to predict hard and
soft-responses of the three configurations: standard arbiter PUFs, FF PUFs and MFF
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PUFs. These models were trained using silicon data extracted from 32-stage arbiter
PUF circuits fabricated using IBM 32 nm HKMG process and achieve a response-
prediction accuracy of 99.8% in case of standard arbiter PUFs, approximately 97% in
case FF PUFs and approximately 99% in case of MFF PUFs. Also, a probability based
thresholding scheme is used to define soft-responses and artificial neural networks were
trained to predict these soft-responses. If the response of a given challenge has at least
90% consistency on repeated evaluation, it is considered stable. It is shown that the soft-
response models can be used to filter out unstable challenges from a randomly chosen
independent test-set. From the test measurements, it is observed that the probability
of a stable challenge is typically in the range of 87% to 92%. However, if a challenge
is chosen with the proposed soft-response model, then its portability of being stable is
found to be 99% compared to the ground truth.
Third, we provide the first systematic empirical analysis of the effect of FF PUF
design choices on their reliability and attack resistance. FF PUFs consist of feed-forward
loops that enable internally generated responses to be used as select-bits, making them
slightly more secure than a standard arbiter PUFs. While FF PUFs have been analyzed
earlier, no prior study has addressed the effect of loop positions on the security and
reliability. After evaluating the performance of hundreds of PUF structures in various
design configurations, it is observed that the locations of the arbiters and their outputs
can have a substantial impact on the security and reliability of FF PUFs. Appropriately
choosing the input and output locations of the FF loops, the amount of data required
to attack can be increased by 7 times and can be further increased by 15 times if two
intermediate arbiters are used. It is observed adding more loops makes PUFs more
susceptible to noise; FF PUFs with 5 intermediate arbiters can have reliability values
that are as low as 81%. It is further demonstrated that a soft-response thresholding
strategy can significantly increase the reliability during authentication to more than
96%.
It is known that XOR arbiter PUFs (XOR PUFs) were introduced as more secure
alternatives to standard arbiter PUFs. XOR PUFs typically contain multiple standard
arbiter PUFs as their components and the output of the component PUFs is XOR-ed
to generate the final response. Finally, we propose the design of feed-forward XOR
PUFs (FFXOR PUFs) where each component PUF is an FF PUF instead of a standard
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arbiter PUF. Attack-resistance analysis of FFXOR PUFs was carried out by employing
artificial neural networks with 2-3 hidden layers and compared with XOR PUFs. It is
shown that FFXOR PUFs cannot be accurately modeled if the number of component
PUFs is more than 5. However, the increase in the attack resistance comes at the cost
of degraded reliability. We also show that the soft-response thresholding strategy can
increase the reliability of FFXOR PUFs by about 30%.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research overview
The rapid development of computing hardware has provided the software flexibility to
enable convenient mobile data processing. Indeed, devices such as smartphones have
become a unified platform capable of conducting financial transactions and storing a
user’s private information. Due to the mobile nature of electronic devices, privacy and
security are pressing concerns especially in cases where an adversary can gain physical
access to the devices. Traditional security measures involve storing a secret key in a
non-volatile memory such as an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
(EEPROM) or a static random-access memory (SRAM) which can be expensive in
terms of their area and power consumption. Also, the secrecy is difficult to uphold in
practice. With embedded devices becoming more ubiquitous, there is a requirement for
low-power, low-area and low-cost hardware security alternatives.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are light-weight, low-cost hardware security
primitives that can be used to securely authenticate devices or generate cryptographic
keys without the involvement of non-volatile memories. This is accomplished by harvest-
ing inherent randomness in manufacturing process variations of integrated circuits (ICs)
to create secret keys. PUFs were introduced in the very beginning of the twenty first
century, first as physical one-way functions [2], then as physical random functions [3]
and finally as physical unclonable functions or PUFs. Since then, numerous PUF re-
alizations have been proposed [4] [5]. Based on whether they are typically used for
1
2authentication or key generation, PUFs can be broadly categorized as “strong PUFs”
or “weak PUFs”. One of the fundamental differences between strong PUFs and weak
PUFs is that weak PUFs support a small number of unique challenges while strong
PUFs can process a large number of challenges. As a result, strong PUFs make it un-
feasible for an adversary to access all the challenge-response pairs (CRPs) in a limited
time. Arbiter PUFs are an example of strong PUFs.
In this work, we analyze and evaluate the performance of various arbiter PUF struc-
tures that exploit the manufacturing variability in gate delay as the source of unclon-
able randomness. Unclonablity, reliability, uniqueness and randomness are fundamental
characteristics of PUFs [6] [7]. Unclonablity ensures resilience against attacks that can
replicate the behavior of a PUF. Reliability is a measure of robustness against noise
and environmental variations. Uniqueness ensures a PUF produces unique responses
compared to other PUFs with identical design and layout while randomness ensures
that responses of a PUF are not biased towards a 0 or a 1.
This work mainly focuses on attack-resistance and reliability analyses. As discussed
in [8], possible attacking strategies on PUFs can be classified into 3 kinds: Prediction
attacks, Reverse engineering attacks and Collision attacks. A Reverse engineering attack
attempts to learn the behavior of a PUF by studying the input-output relation between
several challenge response pairs. The knowledge of the PUF architecture and the amount
of CRPs available usually have a significant effect on the feasibility of an attack. Several
reverse engineering attack strategies have been proposed in the past. The authors in [9]
have demonstrated the vulnerability of arbiter PUFs to modeling attacks and executed
an attack strategy using a machine learning technique. In [10] and [11], responses from
silicon data have been used to model attacks on arbiter PUFs using machine learning
algorithms. Despite this limitation, they are used as building blocks in variants like
XOR arbiter PUFs [12], lightweight secure PUFs [13], and composite PUFs [14] because
of their low area overhead and availability of a large set of challenge-response pairs
(CRPs). Feed-forward arbiter PUFs and XOR arbiter PUFs were introduced as more
secure alternatives to standard arbiter PUFs. However, the added security comes at the
cost of degraded reliability, i.e., they are more susceptible to noise. In this thesis, we
study the attack resistance and reliability of various configurations of standard arbiter
PUFs, Feed-forward arbiter PUFs and XOR arbiter PUFs.
31.2 Outline of the thesis
• Chapter 2 describes the designs and the mathematical models of standard, feed-
forward and modified feed forward arbiter PUFs. It also presents methods to
estimate the physical parameters, that characterize these PUFs, using challenge-
response pairs.
• In Chapter 3, artificial neural network models to predict hard and soft-responses
are presented and their implications are discussed.
• Chapter 4 studies the effect of feed-forward loops placement on attack-resistance
and reliability of feed-forward PUFs with multiple loops.
• Chapter 5 proposes and analyzes feed-forward XOR PUFs in terms of their attack-
resistance and reliability.
• Chapter 6 presents the main observations derived in the thesis and briefly discusses
the future directions.
Chapter 2
Estimating Delay Differences of
Standard and Feed-Forward
Arbiter PUFs
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a novel approach to estimate the delay difference of each MUX stage in
a PUF using measured data from PUF chips fabricated in 32 nm process is presented.
A total of six PUF chips were fabricated and 96 MUX PUF circuits were implemented
on each chip. The layout was identical for each PUF circuit. Challenge-Response test
data are used to model the delay differences of each MUX stage using a simple least
mean square (LMS) adaptive filtering algorithm. The advantage of this approach is that
the delay differences of arbiter PUFs can be estimated without using any sophisticated
machine learning techniques. Additionally, parameters involved in feed-forward and
modified feed-forward configurations are observed. It is shown that the delay differences
indeed follow a Gaussian distribution which is a standard assumption. It is also shown
that the delay differences of the various stages of the PUF circuits in each chip and
among all chips are unique. These delay differences have not been estimated in any
prior analysis of MUX PUFs. The fact that the delay differences belong to the same
Gaussian PDF has also not been confirmed from test data before. An approach to
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Figure 2.1: Structure of a standard arbiter based PUF.
estimate arbiter delays utilizing these delay differences for feed-forward and modified
feed-forward PUFs is also presented in this chapter.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Arbiter Based PUFs
Arbiter PUFs [15] [9] are delay based PUFs that use an arbiter circuit in order to
compare path delays of the circuit. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the basic structure of an arbiter
based MUX PUF. In a MUX PUF, the delay difference between the two possible paths of
a MUX stage is different for each stage in a chip. The challenge is typically a randomly
chosen binary vector whose length is same as the number of stages in the circuit. It can
be observed that there are two possible paths that are excited by the rising edge and
hence a race condition is established to reach the output. The choice of the challenge
vector affects the individual path delays at each stage of the PUF and hence the overall
path delays. The function of the arbiter circuit is to determine which rising edge arrives
first and assign the output, i.e., the response to 0 or 1, accordingly.
A standard arbiter PUF can be characterized by an additive linear delay model [15]
[13] [16]. An additive delay model is based on the assumption that the total delay in a
path is sum of the delays due to elementary components. This further implies that the
ultimate difference in path delays can be modeled as sum of individual delay differences
at each stage. The individual delay difference at the ith stage, denoted by ∆i, depends
on the ith bit of the challenge vector. Thus, the response of an arbiter based PUF
which is based on the overall delay difference between the paths is influenced by the
corresponding challenge vector. If Ci denotes the challenge bit at the i -th stage of an
6arbiter PUF with N stages, the overall delay difference ∆ can be computed as
∆ =
N∑
i=1
(−1)Xi∆i, (2.1)
where each Xi is computed as a cumulative XOR of the successive challenge bits, i.e.,
Xi = Ci+1 ⊕ Ci+2... ⊕ CN for i = 1 to N − 1 and XN = 0. The response R is 0 or 1
depending on the sign of the overall delay difference.
R =
1,∆ ≥ 00,∆ < 0. (2.2)
Like any physical circuit, PUFs are also subject to random noise. As a result of
uncertainty due to noise and manufacturing processes there may be setup-hold time
violations in the arbiter circuit leading to meta-stable outputs. The output or the
response in this case is referred to as an unstable response.
2.2.2 Feed-Forward PUFs
The ability to model arbiter PUFs as linear models makes it susceptible to modeling
attacks where an attacker tries to build a software clone of the PUF. As a way to make
arbiter PUFs more secure, feed-forward PUFs (FF PUFs) have been proposed [15] [9]
[16]. Structure of a simple feed-forward arbiter PUF is depicted in Fig. 2.2. In this
case, an additional arbiter, called intermediate arbiter, is used to determine the outputs
of one of the intermediate stages which is then used as a select bit for one of the later
stages. Note that multiple internal arbiters can also be used. This improves security
by introducing non-linearity into the model making it more complex since the additive
linear delay model is no longer valid. Moreover, this introduces uncertainty as the
locations of the internal feed-forward loops are hidden to the adversary making it more
difficult to build an accurate model. Multiple such feed-forward loops can be used to
make it more complex.
2.2.3 Modified Feed-Forward PUFs
One of the drawbacks of using FF PUFs is that reliability is degraded as compared to
a standard arbiter PUF of same size [7]. Reliability is the ability to produce a constant
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Figure 2.3: Structure of a Modified feed-forward PUF (MFF PUF).
response to the same challenge under different environmental conditions. To improve
reliability, a modified feed-forward PUF (MFF PUF) structure shown in Fig. 2.3 was
proposed in [7]. In this configuration, the arbiter output from an intermediate stage is
used as a challenge bit for two consecutive later stages.
2.2.4 Least Mean Square (LMS) Algorithm
Gradient descent or the method of steepest descent [17] is an adaptive optimization
algorithm used to minimize (or maximize) a given function, referred as the cost function.
Starting from an arbitrary tap-weight vector (w), the solution improves iteratively. In
each iteration, the weight vector is adjusted in the direction of the steepest descent or the
direction opposite to the gradient of the cost function. Ultimately, under appropriate
conditions, the solution converges to the Wiener solution. The LMS algorithm is based
on an approximation of gradient descent where an instantaneous estimate of the gradient
computed from available data is used. Therefore, the LMS algorithm is essentially a
tool to estimate the parameters (called weights) which optimally express a given input-
output relation by minimizing a so called cost function.
In this context, the objective is to minimize the mean squared error between the
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Figure 2.4: Block diagram of the LMS algorithm
predicted response and the desired response. In other words, we estimate the delay
differences by using challenges and responses as inputs and outputs of the desired model.
As described in the previous section, an arbiter PUF is a delay based model and can
be characterized by the additive linear delay model. These parameters, i.e., the delay
differences at each stage or the values of ∆i’s, are considered as the weights of an
adaptive filter. Fig. 2.4 shows the block diagram which illustrates the sequence of steps
involved in estimating these weights based on the LMS algorithm from a given set of
CRPs [18]. The input vector is concatenated with a ‘1’ to account for the bias. So, the
tap-weight vector is of size N + 1 if the MUX has N stages. The filter output y(n) is
then computed and compared to the desired response bit d(n). The difference e(n) is
then used to update the weights.
2.2.5 Single Layer Perceptrons
Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) were used to model the functionality of PUFs. These
models were then used to predict responses. We need to provide sufficiently large amount
of data to a machine learning algorithm, in order to learn a predictive model. The data
in this case are the available CRPs. The simplest version of an Artificial Neural Network
is called a single layer perceptron or, simply, a perceptron. A perceptron is the basic
processing element in any ANN and defines a hyper-plane which can be used to divide
the input space into two groups [19]. This can therefore be applied to train a binary
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Figure 2.5: Die photo of the PUF [1].
classifier. In this work, perceptron structures with a hard-limit transfer function were
implemented to train a software model of standard arbiter PUFs.
2.3 Experimental Setup
The PUFs under study were implemented in 32nm HKMG test chips in three different
configurations: standard arbiter based PUF, FF PUF (with one loop) and MFF PUF.
Each chip contains 96 PUF circuits and six such chips were tested. Each PUF can
be configured as a linear PUF, FF PUF, and MFF PUF by programming two control
bits [1]. The die photo is shown in Fig. 2.5. The PUFs thus manufactured were
observed to exhibit a high degree of uniqueness and randomness [1]. For the purpose
of estimating delay differences, 96 standard arbiter PUFs on a chip were tested and
their corresponding CRPs were extracted. Two standard arbiter PUFs are analyzed to
predict hard-responses and soft-responses. Four PUFs (two from each chip) from each
configuration are analyzed. Each PUF is a 32-stage MUX based PUF, i.e., multiplexers
are used as switching elements in each of the 32 stages. An on chip voltage-controlled
oscillator (VCO) and counter are used to measure responses reliably and efficiently. A
10
set of 10,000 and 20,000 unique challenges were randomly generated in order to evaluate
standard arbiter PUFs and FF PUFs, respectively.
2.4 Estimating the Physical Parameters of Standard Ar-
biter PUFs
2.4.1 Model Accuracy
As we have a 32 stage PUF, each challenge is a 32-bit vector. So, 33 tap-weights
are defined, including a weight for the bias term, and are initialized to random values
between 0 and 1. The number of CRPs used for training the model is varied in order to
observe its effect on model accuracy and model parameters. In order to obtain reliable
estimates, a five-fold cross validation scheme is used to validate the trained models.
This means that 80% of the available data is used to train the model and the remaining
20% is used to validate it, and this is repeated for five times, until all the data are
tested. The response of the model is decided to be either ‘0’ or ‘1’ based on whether
the output is positive or negative. These model responses are compared with the true
responses to compute classification accuracies. The average accuracy across the five
folds is considered as accuracy of the model.
This chapter considers modeling of the MUX PUF using perceptron and the LMS
algorithm. The results of the two modeling approaches are compared. The LMS al-
gorithm applies the gradient descent with adaptive learning rate to train the network.
Mean square error is used as the cost function. The data are divided into 5 folds out
of which, 3 folds are used for training while one fold is used for validation and the
remaining fold is used to test the accuracy of the model. The validation fold is required
in order to test the convergence of the network and decide when to stop training. These
are implemented using MATLAB neural network toolbox.
Fig. 2.6(a) shows how the accuracy of the models based on the LMS varies with
the number of CRPs available. Fig. 2.6(b) shows the variation of testing accuracy of
models trained using single layer perceptron, as a function of number of CRPs. Each
figure has two plots corresponding to the data from PUFs on two different chips.
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Figure 2.6: Prediction accuracy of a model based on LMS and perceptron plotted against
total number of CRPs.
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2.4.2 Convergence of the Estimated Values
The ∆ values cannot be considered as estimates of parameters of a PUF if they are not
reliable and consistent. In order to validate the reliability of these estimates, the PUFs
have been modeled multiple times and convergence of the estimates has been verified.
Initially they are assigned a random value between 0 and 1. As the training progresses,
they converge to their true values. Fig. 2.7(a) shows how the estimated delay differ-
ences change as more challenges are used for training. The values oscillate initially and
gradually attain a stable value. Fig. 2.7(b) shows the model parameters estimated
using the perceptron algorithm as a function of number of CRPs used. Initially, the
model parameters vary considerably with change in challenges but they gradually sta-
bilize as the CRPs increase in number. Moreover, the delay differences estimated using
LMS algorithm have been observed to be scaled versions of the model parameters of
perceptron.
Fig. 2.8 presents a comparison of estimated delay differences using both techniques.
Each value plotted corresponds to delay difference at a given stage (represented on the
X-axis). A scale factor of -100 has been multiplied to the LMS estimates. Fig. 2.8 clearly
illustrates a one-to-one correspondence between the models. Thus, delay differences can
be estimated from either the LMS model or the perceptron model.
2.4.3 Distribution of the Delay Parameters
Besides the susceptibility of arbiter PUFs to modeling attacks, the ability to characterize
the PUFs and estimate their individual delay differences at each stage is very significant.
96 PUFs were fabricated on a chip and 1000 CRPs were recorded for each of these PUFs.
Based on these CRPs, PUF parameters (∆ values) were estimated and recorded. Fig.
2.9 shows the distribution of the estimated delay differences for 96 PUFs from one chip
at the 17th stage. It has been observed that at every stage, the delay difference values
follow a similar Gaussian distribution. In a prior statistical analysis of MUX based
PUFs [7], the delays were modeled as an independently identically distributed (i.i.d.)
random variable. The histogram in Fig. 2.9 validates those assumptions.
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Figure 2.7: Estimated model parameters plotted against number of CRPs used for
modeling PUF-1 from chip 1
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Figure 2.9: Distribution of estimated delay differences at the 17th stage
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2.5 Estimating the Intermediate Bias of Feed-Forward PUFs
The knowledge of knowing individual delay differences opens new possibilities. One
of them is the ability to learn other unknown physical characteristics of delay based
PUFs. The standard arbiter PUFs studied earlier were modified into feed-forward and
modified feed-forward structures as shown in Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3. As a result, we now
have the knowledge of individual delay differences of FF PUFs. Using these values, we
claim that we can mathematically model different configurations of FF and MFF PUFs.
But the only missing piece of information is the path delays caused by the feed-forward
loops and the intermediate arbiters. We propose an approach to empirically estimate
the effect of these values based on CRPs of the FF PUFs.
In case of the FF PUFs, there is a loop which connects the output of 16th stage
to 26th stage, i.e., the challenge bit input of the 26th stage is now replace by the
intermediate output from the 16th stage. We know that the first 15 stages still act as a
standard arbiter PUF whose ∆ values are known. Therefore according to the additive
linear delay model, we can compute the intermediate output R16 as
R16 = sign(
16∑
i=1
(−1)Xi∆i +Bint), (2.3)
where Xi = Ci+1⊕Ci+2...⊕C16, for i=1 to 15 (X16 = 0) and Bint is the intermediate bias
that we need to estimate. Then we can use the additive linear delay model, described
in (2.1) and (2.2) to model FF PUF with 26th challenge bit input C26 replaced with
R16. Similarly in order to model MFF PUFs, we replace C26 and C27 with R16. Thus,
these formulations of feed-forward configurations have a direct correspondence to the
structure of their circuit.
The unknown value R16 is estimated by assuming search range is between -1 to +1.
So, for all values between -1 and +1 the final outputs for a set of challenges of the
PUF is computed using the model described above. For this purpose, we use a data
set of 18000 randomly chosen challenges with stable responses. These outputs are then
compared to the ground truth to calculate the accuracy of the model. The value of the
intermediate bias (Bint) is chosen as the one with maximum model accuracy. Moreover,
a five-fold cross validation is used to test the reliability of the estimated value of Bint
on a independent test set. A pseudo code for this algorithm is presented in Algorithm.
16
1.
Algorithm 1 Estimating intermediate bias of feed-forward PUFs
Input: CRPs (C, R), ∆ values
Output: Bint
for Bint = values between -1 and +1 do
for each challenge vector C in the training set do
Compute R16 according to (2.3)
Replace C26 with R16
Replace C27 with R16 (In the case of modified feed-forward configuration)
Compute R according to (2.1) and (2.2)
end for
Compare with ground truth and compute accuracy
end for
B∗int ← Bint with maximum accuracy return B∗int
2.5.1 Results
12000 stable challenge responses pairs were used to analyze two PUFs in multiple con-
figurations. 10000 CRPs were used for estimation and 2000 CRPs were used to test
the estimated bias. As mentioned earlier, the values of overall bias which encompasses
the effect of the final arbiter were estimated to be -0.1931 and 0.0245 for PUF-1 and
PUF-2, respectively. The accuracies for each assumed value in the range +1 and -1 is
plotted in Fig. 2.10. As the effect of intermediate arbiter is same for both feed-forward
and modified feed-forward, the value of Bint should be the same. As expected, similar
analysis of modified feed-forward configuration of the same PUFs resulted in the same
estimates as depicted in Fig. 2.11. It can be observed that there is only one peak and
the accuracy drops as we go away from the optimal value.
The values of the internal bias, Bint, are estimated as 0.2525 for PUF-1 and 0.1313
for PUF-2. These estimated values were tested on independent test sets based on five-
fold cross validation. Four folds were used for estimation and one fold for testing. The
test accuracies and the estimates for the five folds are shown in Table 2.1 to demonstrate
consistency of the approach.
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Figure 2.10: Accuracy of intermediate bias in the range -1 to +1 for feed-forward
configuration.
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Even though predicting responses of an arbiter PUF has been studied previously, the
LMS algorithm based approach establishes that sophisticated machine learning tech-
niques are not required for creating a model for a MUX PUF. As we can observe from
Fig. 2.6(b), by exploiting a slightly more complex structure of neural networks, we
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Table 2.1: Estimated Intermediate Bias Values and the Corresponding Test Accuracies.
Fold 1 Fold 2 Fold 3 Fold 4 Fold 5 Mean
Feed-Forward PUF-1
Bint 0.2525 0.2525 0.2525 0.2525 0.2525 0.2525
Acc. 0.9971 0.9958 0.9975 0.9979 0.9967 0.9970
Feed-Forward PUF-2
Bint 0.1313 0.1313 0.1313 0.1313 0.1313 0.1313
Acc. 0.9967 0.9983 0.9979 0.9971 0.9992 0.9978
Modified Feed-Forward PUF-1
Bint 0.2525 0.2525 0.2525 0.2525 0.2525 0.2525
Acc. 0.9975 0.9983 0.9983 0.9992 0.9975 0.9982
Modified Feed-Forward PUF-2
Bint 0.1313 0.1313 0.1313 0.1313 0.1313 0.1313
Acc. 0.9975 0.9992 1.0 0.9983 0.9988 0.9988
are able to predict the response almost with certainty. Though the LMS approach is
not 100% accurate, it provides a significant accuracy of around 97.5% for one PUF
and around 99.5% for the other. A notable advantage of this approach, as compared
to machine learning methods, is its simplicity. It has also been observed that LMS
method requires considerably less training time per iteration as compared to the above
mentioned ANNs.
Usually, a large set of CRPs corresponding to each chip is stored in a server for the
purpose of authenticating the ICs. But storing these ∆ values (and the intermediate
arbiter bias) instead of CRPs provides certain benefits. First, the storage memory
requirement is considerably reduced. Moreover, it is impractical to store all the possible
CRPs since the number increases exponentially as the size (number of stages) of the
PUF increases. Storing the ∆ values enables the server to verify the responses of an
arbitrary subset of challenges on demand. These model parameters can also be used to
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choose preferable (more reliable) challenges which will be discussed in the later chapters.
Chapter 3
Predicting Hard and
Soft-Responses of Feed-Forward
PUFs using ANNs
3.1 Introduction
The ability to model arbiter PUFs as linear models makes it susceptible to modeling
attacks where an attacker tries to build a software clone of the PUF. As a way to make
arbiter PUFs more secure, FF PUFs have been proposed [15] [16]. As described in
Chapter 2, an additional arbiter (called intermediate arbiter) is used in FF PUFs to
determine the response in one of the intermediate stages. This intermediate response
is then used as a challenge bit for one of the later stages. Note that multiple internal
arbiters can also be used to improve security by introducing non-linearity. This chap-
ter studies the unpredictability of PUFs by adopting a black-box approach to model
standard, FF and MFF arbiter PUFs using ANNs. Unpredictability is estimated in
terms of number of CRPs required to train an accurate model of the PUF. Most of the
literature on modeling arbiter PUFs is based on simulations [20]. Even though real data
is utilized in some studies [10] [21] [11], they are confined to standard arbiter PUFs. In
this work, we present models to predict responses of the three types of arbiter PUFs
based on silicon data [1] [15] [16].
20
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Like any physical circuit, PUFs are also subject to random noise. As a result of
uncertainty due to noise and manufacturing processes there may be setup-hold time
violations in the arbiter circuit leading to meta-stable outputs. The output or the
response in this case is referred to as an unstable response. The issue of unreliable
responses and possible counter-measures were discussed in [22]. One of the drawbacks
of using FF PUFs is that reliability is degraded as compared to a standard arbiter PUF
of same size [7]. Reliability is the ability to produce a constant response to the same
challenge under different environmental conditions. To improve reliability, MFF PUFs
were proposed in [7].
This chapter also presents models that are able to accurately predict, for a given
challenge, probability of its response being a ‘1’. This probability is called a soft-response
and these models are called soft-response models. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time models are proposed to predict soft-responses. Storing hard-response
models in the server has been addressed in prior literature [23] [18]. However, we
show that the soft-response models can be stored in the server to detect and discard
unstable responses. Using these soft-response models, the probability of choosing a
stable challenge increases from 89% to more than 98%. Additionally, we show that
these soft-response models achieve high accuracy and hence can be used to predict
response-bits.
3.2 Artificial Neural Network Models
Machine learning (ML) techniques are computer algorithms used to construct complex
input-output mappings. In other words, we use machine learning algorithms to learn
a model from a given subset of inputs and outputs which makes machine learning a
natural approach to model PUFs. In particular, as the response is either 0 or 1, building
a predictor is same as building a binary classifier. Several ML algorithms have been used
in the past to model PUFs. We implement Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) which are
mathematical structures inspired from neural connectivity in human brain. The inputs
and outputs in this case correspond to challenge vectors and responses, respectively.
Single layer perceptron (SLP) is the simplest version of an ANN and is the basic
processing element of any ANN. A perceptron is used to construct a generalized linear
22
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(a) Perceptron with hard-limit transfer function as the activa-
tion function
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(b) Perceptron with sigmoid transfer function as the activation
function
Figure 3.1: Structure of single layer perceptron.
model [24], i.e., a hyperplane in the space of input vectors, of the form given by
y(x) = f(wTx), (3.1)
where x is the feature vector derived from inputs and f is called the activation function.
The model parameters w are trained using a training algorithm such that a cost function
is minimized. The structure of a perceptron can be observed in Fig. 3.1. Either the
activation function shown in Fig. 3.1(a) or Fig. 3.1(b) can be used depending on
whether we need a continuous or a discrete output.
In situations where a linear model is no longer valid, more complex structures called
multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) are required. Multilayered neural networks are able to
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approximate an arbitrary non-linear model by using multiple perceptrons as building
blocks. Optimized parameters of the model are calculated by adapting the model it-
eratively until the cost function reaches a desired value (ideally zero). The model is
usually trained using a form of gradient descent based algorithm called error backprop-
agation [24].
Perceptrons have been used to predict reponses of a linear PUF whose structure
is depicted in Fig. 3.1. In case of standard arbiter PUFs (linear PUFs), a hard-limit
activation function is used for hard-response prediction and for soft-response prediction
a sigmoid activation is used to achieve a continuous output. In case of FF PUFs, we
implement MLPs with one hidden layer to predict hard-responses and a sigmoid transfer
function is used at the output. Equation for the sigmoid transfer function f(.) is given
by f(y) = 1/(1 + exp(−y)). The final outputs are thresholded to be 1 if it is more than
0.5 and 0 otherwise. Predicting soft-responses of FF PUFs is a harder problem and
requires more complex models. To accomplish this, MLPs with two hidden layers have
been employed. In the case of predicting soft-response of FF PUFs, the output layer
uses a linear transfer function. As the outputs are probability values, the model outputs
are restricted to the range between 0 and 1 during the testing phase. Architecture
of MLP with one hidden layer used for hard-response prediction and MLP with two
hidden layers used for soft-response prediction of the FF configurations are depicted
in Fig. 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), respectively. In all the cases, hidden neurons comprise a
hyperbolic tangent sigmoid activation function. Equation for the hyperbolic tangent
sigmoid transfer function g(.) is given by g(y) = 2/(1 + exp(−2y)) − 1. In order to
train the neural networks, a variant of the backpropagation algorithm called resilient
backpropagation (RProp) [25] has been used for its efficiency.
3.3 PUF Implementation and Data Extraction
The PUFs under study were implemented in 32nm HKMG test chips in three different
configurations: standard arbiter based PUF, FF PUF (with one loop) and MFF PUF.
Each PUF can be configured as a linear PUF, FF PUF, and MFF PUF by programming
two control bits [1]. Each PUF is a 32-stage MUX based PUF. A set of 10,000 and 20,000
unique challenges were randomly generated in order to evaluate standard arbiter PUFs
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tion of FF and MFF PUFs. The hidden units contain a bias
term as an input (not shown above) and have a hyperbolic tan-
gent sigmoid activation function.
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(b) MLP with two hidden layers used for soft-response prediction
of FF and MFF PUFs. The hidden units contain a bias term
as an input (not shown above) and have a hyperbolic tangent
sigmoid activation function.
Figure 3.2: Structure of multilayer perceptrons.
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and FF PUFs, respectively. About 100,000 repetitive tests were performed for each
challenge and the number of 0’s and the number of 1’s were counted. The soft-response
probabilities are based on these 100k measurements. As environmental variations may
cause changes in the PUF responses, all the measurements were collected at a source
voltage of 0.9 volts and an ambient temperature of 25 degrees Celsius. As a convention,
90-10 thresholding is used to assess stability of the responses. For instance, if the number
of 1’s is less than 10%, the response is considered a stable 0, and if it is greater than
90% it is considered a stable 1. If the value is between 10 and 90, it is considered an
unstable response. Models computed to predict the hard-responses are trained based
on stable responses. For each PUF, the corresponding data set is randomly split into
5 equally sized subsets and five-fold cross validation was employed. 3 of the 5 folds
were used for training while one fold was used for validation and the remaining fold was
used for testing. This was repeated until the entire data set, i.e., all the five folds, were
tested.
3.4 Predicting Hard-Responses
Solution to a classification problem involves finding out the best model from a chosen
set of models called hypothesis space. While dealing with standard arbiter PUFs, the
hypothesis space is the set of all linear models or the set of all 33 dimensional hy-
perplanes. This is because it is established that all standard arbiter PUFs follow the
additive linear delay model. In this case, we implement single layer perceptrons with
hard-limit transfer function, trained according to the perceptron algorithm [24].
In case of the other two configurations, i.e., FF and MFF PUFs, the additive linear
delay model - a linear hypothesis space - is no longer valid. Therefore we employ
multilayer perceptrons with one hidden layer to train these models. The hidden layer
has 30 hidden units. The positions of FF loops are assumed to be unknown to the
attacker and cumulative XOR-ed challenges [15] [16] [11] are used as inputs even in
this case. The neural networks were adapted to minimize mean square error using
resilient backpropagation (RProp) [25] as the training algorithm. RProp was chosen for
its faster and more stable convergence as compared to standard backpropagation. All
hidden neurons have hyperbolic tangent activation functions and the output neuron has
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Table 3.1: Results of the Hard-Response Models
Configuration Chip PUF Mean Acc. Std. Dev. No. of CRPs
Std. 1 1 99.8% 0.11% 1500
2 1 99.7% 0.22% 1500
FF 1 1 97.14% 1.35% 10200
2 96.8% 0.94% 10200
2 1 96.7% 0.84% 9000
2 96.8% 0.49% 9600
MFF 1 1 98.32% 0.18% 7800
2 99.7% 0.26% 7200
2 1 98.6% 0.18% 7800
2 98.35% 0.39% 7200
a sigmoid activation. The final outputs are thresholded to be 1 if it is more than 0.5
and 0 otherwise.
3.4.1 Results
Two standard arbiter PUFs have been investigated. For each PUF, models have been
trained by increasing the amount of available stable CRPs in each case. For every model,
mean accuracy of the five-folds along with its corresponding standard deviations were
observed. It was eventually observed that both the PUFs can be modeled almost with
certainty (99.8% accuracy) by using 1200 CRPs for training.
Four PUFs (two from each chip) in FF configuration and four PUFs in MFF config-
uration are analyzed. For each PUF, multiple models were computed by increasing the
size of the data set from 2000 CRPs to 17000 CRPs, i.e, the number of CRPs used for
training is increased from 1200 to 10200 (60% of the total). In each case, the five-fold
cross validation scheme results in five sub-models. Mean of the classification accuracies
is used as evaluation metric for each model. The corresponding standard deviations
are also observed to verify convergence of the sub-models. In the case of FF PUFs, on
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average, all models reach a maximum accuracy of about 97% by using approximately
10000 CRPs for training. High values of accuracy accompanied by very small standard
deviation indicates robustness of the models. In the case of MFF PUFs, all PUFs attain
a maximum accuracy of approximately 98.5% while reaching a significant value of 98%
at only 6000 CRPs. These results for all configurations are summarized in Table 3.1. It
can be observed that MFF PUFs are less secure than FF PUFs in spite of the additional
non-linearity.
3.5 Predicting Soft-Responses
The objective of a soft-response model is to predict the probability of response being 1,
P (R = 1). In this case, the output is no longer a single bit response but a real number
between 0 and 1. In other words, this is a regression problem instead of a binary
classification problem and hence requires more accurate modeling. Moreover, unstable
responses are also taken into consideration while predicting soft-responses. Models are
evaluated based on mean absolute error (MAE) of the test set and accuracy is defined
as 1−MAE.
In case of standard arbiter PUF, we employed a single layer perceptron with sigmoid
transfer function at the output. In case of FF PUFs, MLPs with one hidden layer were
not able to attain accuracies of more than 90%. To this end, we used two-hidden layer
MLPs with 30 and 10 units in the first and second hidden layers, respectively. These
MLPs were trained using resilient backpropagation. All hidden neurons have hyperbolic
tangent activation functions and the output neuron has a linear activation. As the
outputs are probability values, the model outputs are restricted to the range between
0 and 1 during the testing phase. Mean and standard deviation of the accuracy values
for 5 folds were computed while increasing the training size from 1000 CRPs to 18000
CRPs. Correspondingly the number of CRPs required for training was increased from
600 to 10800 as three of the five folds were used for this purpose.
3.5.1 Results
Soft-response prediction accuracies of the two standard arbiter PUFs are displayed in
Fig. 3.3(a). Y-axis represents the mean test accuracy of five folds and X-axis represents
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the number of CRPs used for training or three folds. Accuracy is evaluated based on
mean absolute error. Vertical bar at each data-point represents the standard deviation
of accuracy values across the five folds. It is observed from the plot that both the PUFs
achieve a high accuracy of approximately 98.5% accuracy using only 500 CRPs and
attain a steady-state accuracy of 98.8% eventually. It can also be noted that along with
increased accuracy standard deviation for the five sub-models becomes closer to zero.
Fig. 3.3(b) shows that model outputs closely resembles the ground truth.
Results of the four FF PUFs are illustrated in Fig. 3.4. While the accuracy values
differ among the PUFs, all models attain more than 95% accuracy. Models of PUF-
1 and PUF-2 on the first chip have 95.77% and 96.6% accuracy, respectively, while
the models of the PUFs on chip-2 achieve 95.3% accuracy. Overall, we can say that
soft-responses of FF PUFs can be predicted with an accuracy of 95-96% using 10,000
training samples.
The soft-response models of MFF PUFs are evaluated as shown in Fig. 3.5. On
chip-1, models of PUF-1 and PUF-2 eventually attain maximum accuracies of 96%
and 97.4%, respectively. In case of chip-2, both the PUFs attain 96.2%. A subset of
model outputs for a FF PUF and a MFF PUF are plotted in Fig. 3.6 along with the
ground truth as a reference. This depicts the similarity between predicted and actual
soft-responses.
3.6 Identifying Unstable Responses
During a typical authentication process, a randomly chosen set of challenges are tested
and Hamming distance of the response string is used for validation. A large portion
of these challenges could lead to unstable responses. 8-13% of the responses have been
observed to be unstable according to the test data. The ability to tell beforehand if a
given challenge can produce a stable response could be useful. In a 32-bit challenge, the
total number of challenges is 232 or approximately 4.3 billion. Based on experimental
data, the percent of stable challenges was found to be about 90%. Thus, the number of
stable challenges is approximately 3.86 billion. The unstable challenges are unreliable
for authentication. We claim that the predicted soft-responses using our models are
accurate enough to validate stability of a response without actually testing them on the
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Figure 3.3: Soft-response model accuracy for std. arbiter PUFs.
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Table 3.2: Percent of Stable Responses in the Test Set Before and After the Elimination
Config.
Original set New set
Chip/ No. of % # CRPs %
PUF CRPs Stable Chosen Stable
Std. 1/1 1000 91.4% 905 99.7%
2/1 1000 91.7% 909 99.1%
FF 1/1 4000 86.9% 3162 98.2%
1/2 4000 87.25% 3374 98.3%
2/1 4000 89.52% 3301 98.7%
2/2 4000 90.85% 3424 98.8%
MFF 1/1 4000 86.95% 3293 97.4%
1/2 4000 89.75 3536 98.3%
2/1 4000 91.62 3393 98.9%
2/2 4000 92.2 3487 99.3%
circuit.
For a given challenge, the first step is to use the models to determine the soft-
response which is then used to determine if the response is unstable based on 0.1-0.9
thresholds. This allows the server to issue unstable challenges but not use them for
authentication. This approach enhances the security of the PUF. Table 3.2 provides a
comparison between proportion of stable responses in the original data and proportion
of stable responses in the new set, after the elimination process. Moreover, we argue
that these soft-response models can be simultaneously used to predict hard-responses
by simply thresholding the predicted soft-responses. It is to be noted that the results
are based on evaluation over an independent test set whose sizes are reported in the
table (3rd column). For instance, consider PUF-1 in the first chip in FF configuration.
4000 independent random challenges are examined out of which only 86.9% are stable
according to the test measurements. Using the soft-response model 3162 (out of the
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Table 3.3: Summary of ANN Models Used
Type of Type of #Hidden Intermediate Final
PUF response neurons activation activation
Std. Hard 0 - Hard-limit
Soft 0 - Sigmoid
FF Hard 30 tanh Sigmoid
Soft 30, 10 tanh Linear
MFF Hard 30 tanh Sigmoid
Soft 30, 10 tanh Linear
4000) are found to be stable. By comparing with the ground truth, it turns out that
98.2% of these 3162 CRPs are in fact stable. Using this approach, the proportion of
unstable CRPs in the new set falls to less than 3%. This enables the server to issue and
verify the response for any randomly chosen challenge at will by storing these models.
3.7 Conclusion
Since a typical application of a PUF is to generate cryptographic keys, unpredictability
is a vital security property of any PUF. One way to compare PUFs in terms of their
practical unpredictability is to build modeling attacks and compare the ease of attack
[26]. In terms of security, it is observed that Standard < MFF < FF; however, this
is valid for the specific configurations evaluated and may not be valid for arbitrary
configurations. We have shown that hard and soft-response models can be trained for
linear and nonlinear PUFs. The ANN models used for training of various PUFs are
summarized in Table 3.3. The soft-response models can be used to eliminate unstable
challenges and substantially increase the proportion of stable CRPs from about 90% to
99%. Furthermore, these models can be used to predict the stable hard-responses by
thresholding the soft-response model outputs, thereby enabling the server to test any
random challenge without having to store a large set of CRPs.
Chapter 4
Effect of Loop Positions on
Attack-Resistance and Reliability
of Feed-Forward PUFs
4.1 Introduction
FF PUFs containing one to five intermediate arbiters [16] [7] are considered in this chap-
ter. Several prior studies [10] [11] [27] [28] have demonstrated vulnerability of FF PUFs
to attacks. However, the structure of FF PUFs in these studies was chosen arbitrarily
and focused on FF PUFs with loops cascaded with each other or placed separately from
each other. In this work, we explore various configurations and determine how changing
the location of feed-forward loop inputs and outputs affects the security and reliabil-
ity. Also, most of the prior studies employ evolutionary strategies to learn a predictive
model of a FF PUF. The limitation of this approach is that the attacker is assumed
to have the knowledge of the PUF design, i.e., number of feed-forward loops and the
location of their inputs and outputs. We do not make any such assumptions in this
work and incorporate a black-box approach. We also do not focus on the class of attack
strategies that use side-channel information [21] [28] [29].
Unpredictability, reliability and uniqueness are fundamental characteristics of PUFs.
Unpredictability ensures resilience against cloning attacks and reliability is a measure
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of robustness to environmental noise. Uniqueness makes sure that the outputs of PUFs
with identical design and layout produce unique responses. A major limitation of FF
PUFs is that reliability is degraded in comparison with standard arbiter PUFs of same
size [7]. Reliability is the ability to produce a constant response to the same challenge
under different environmental conditions. To improve the reliability, a modified FF PUF
structure was proposed in [7]. It has been shown in [27] that modified FF PUFs have
a degraded security in spite of having two loops which accounts for more non-linearity.
One of the goals of this work is to see if changing the FF loop location could be an
effective countermeasure to improve the security of FF PUFs. Additionally, we propose
an entropy based metric to estimate the unpredictability of a PUF structure. It is based
on the idea of measuring entropy of challenge and response deviations between standard
and FF-PUFs. Since, standard arbiter PUFs are known to be predictable, we believe
that higher degree of entropy is an indication of higher unpredictability.
We also empirically estimate the reliability of FF PUFs and how it is affected by
the choice of feed-forward loop positions. While FF PUFs have been analyzed earlier,
no prior study has addressed the effect of loop positions on the security and reliability.
It is shown that the locations of the arbiters and their outputs can affect the security
and reliability of the FF PUF. Additionally, we incorporate a soft-response thresholding
strategy [27] to identify stable challenges and show that reliability can be increased
significantly for authentication.
4.2 Feed-Forward PUF Structures
Due to their lack of uniqueness, FF PUFs with one loop are not considered in this
study [30]. However, FF PUFs with two loops are considered. In case of double-loop
FF PUFs there is one intermediate arbiter with two outputs, i.e., the output of the
intermediate arbiter is used to replace the select bit of two later stages as shown in Fig.
4.1. The output of the intermediate arbiter located at stage N1 is fed to stages N2 and
N3. If the two output stages are adjacent, i.e., if N3 = N2 + 1, it is referred to as a
modified FF PUF [7].
Alternatively, we could generate the two intermediate responses from two different
arbiters. We denote the input and output stage locations of the first FF loop as N11 and
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Figure 4.1: Double-loop feed-forward PUF. Intermediate arbiter is located at stage N1.
The intermediate output is fed to stages N2 and N3.
N12, respectively. The input and output positions of the second loop are denoted as N21
and N22, respectively (see Fig. 4.2). Depending on the relative positions of these two FF
loops, there are four possible configurations: FF overlap, FF cascade, FF separate [31]
and FF nested. If one loop is enclosed by the other loop, it is referred to as FF nested
configuration. If there is at least one stage overlapped between the two loops it is called
feed-forward overlap structure. If the output stage of the first loop is same as the input
stage of the second loop, it is called feed-forward cascade structure. When there is at
least one stage separation between the output of the first loop and input of the second
loop it is called feed-forward separate. Cascade and overlap configurations with two
loops were shown to exhibit poor uniqueness properties and hence we do not consider
these structures in this work. The structures of nested and overlap configurations are
depicted in Fig. 4.2.
4.3 Reliability Definition
Depending on the challenge bits, the path delays of the two paths of an arbiter PUF
can be similar. Under these circumstances, as a result of uncertainty due to noise and
manufacturing processes there may be setup-hold time violations in the arbiter leading
to meta-stable outputs. The susceptibility of a PUF to these effects can be characterized
by reliability. Reliability of a PUF gives an estimate of how consistent the response is
for a given challenge under noise. For each of thr PUFs examples considered, 100 noisy
responses are generated. To emulate the effect of environmental and measurement noise,
Gaussian noise is added to the delay difference parameter at every stage. To compute the
stability of a PUF circuit, the same challenge is provided as input under different values
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(b) Feed-forward overlap.
Figure 4.2: Feed-forward PUFs with two intermediate arbiters.
of noise and the associated responses are recorded. Reliability metric is mathematically
defined in terms of intra-chip variation (or intra-chip Hamming distance) [6]. Assume
R is an n-bit response vector used as a reference and the noisy response-vectors are
denoted by R′. An empirical estimate of intra-chip variation, Pintra, is given by,
Pintra =
1
m
m∑
i=1
HD(R,R′i)
n
(4.1)
where m is the number of noisy response-vectors that represent different environmental
conditions. Reliability can be computed as (1− Pintra)× 100%.
4.4 Simulation Details
Variants of the additive linear delay model are used to simulate several FF PUF con-
figurations. As mentioned in previous literature, i.i.d. standard normal distributions
can be used to model delay difference values at each stage of the PUF [11]. It is known
that a Gaussian distribution with non-zero mean and unit variance captures the effect
of arbiter [18]. So, we sample arbiter delays from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0.1
and variance 1. We believe that the non-zero mean emulates the effect of arbiter bias.
Additionally, noise has been added to all the simulation models to make them more
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realistic and to observe its effect. An additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and 5%
noise level is added to delay difference parameters (∆i) at each stage and to the arbiter
delay (∆arb) [7] [32]. Noise level is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of the
noise to the standard deviation of delay differences at each stage.
We consider two FF PUF configurations: one intermediate arbiter with two outputs
(double-loop), and two intermediate arbiters each with its own output (two loops). Feed-
forward arbiter PUFs with one intermediate arbiter and two intermediate arbiters are
shown in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. In case of double-loop configurations, the input
stage (N1) is considered to be 15. The 25th, 35th and 45th stages are considered as the
candidates for the first output stage of the FF loop (N2) and the second output stage
(N3) is varied from N2 + 1 to 64 in increments of one position. For configurations with
two intermediate arbiters, the first loop is kept constant with N11 = 15 and N12 = 45.
The second intermediate arbiter is placed at stage N21 = 30 and the output location
(N22) is changed from 31 to 64. If N22 is between 31 and 44, it is considered as a
FF nested configuration and if it is between 45 and 64, it is considered as an overlap
configuration.
4.5 Security Analysis
FF PUF structures presented above are considered for the security analysis. To assess
the unpredictability, PUFs in each configuration are attacked using machine learning.
For a given configuration, 10 PUF instances (PUFs with identical design) are simulated
to ensure consistency in the results. For each PUF instance, multilayered perceptrons
with one hidden layer are trained to accurately predict the responses. 20,000 CRPs
each are used for validation and testing while varying the number of CRPs required
for training. The hidden layer comprised of 50 neurons and 80 neurons for structures
with one intermediate arbiter and two intermediate arbiters, respectively. Since an
attacker can easily identify the noisy challenges, we only used the CRPs that have at
least 90% consistency in the presence of noise. As more data are used for training, the
prediction accuracy naturally increases until it reaches a maximum value after which it
gets saturated. Convergence of training, validation and testing errors are examined to
avoid over-training. All the models achieved more than 92% accuracy. Therefore, 8%
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tolerance level is chosen as the threshold to decide if a model is accurate. Minimum
Number of CRPs (approximated to the nearest multiple of 5000) required to reach
92% test accuracy is considered as the evaluation metric to compare unpredictability of
various configurations studied.
4.5.1 Feed-Forward PUFs with One Intermediate Arbiter
Double loop PUFs with N1 = 15 have been trained with varying values of the first
output stage (N2) and the second output stage (N3). The number of CRPs required
to attain 92% accuracy has been recorded for 10 instances in each design. For a given
value of N1 and N2, box-plots illustrating the effect of changing the value of N3 are
shown in Fig. 4.3. In Fig. 4.3(a), it can be observed that as the value of N3 increases,
training data size required to train an accurate model increases until a certain position,
seen to be the 36th stage in this case. After the 60th stage, as we get closer to the
output stage, we need less training information. We can further observe that by just
selecting a better choice of feed-forward loop positions we can increase the number of
required CRPs to train an accurate model by more than 7 times: from 15,000 (N2 = 25
and N3 = 26 - modified FF PUF) to 107,500 (N2 = 25 and N2 = 50).
A similar “inverted-U” trend can be observed in all three cases. It can be observed
that the change in output position of the feed-forward loop has significant effect on
the security of the PUF. These results indicate that the feed-forward loop output stage
should be chosen as far as possible from the input location of the loop as well as the
final stage for better attack-resistance.
4.5.2 Feed-Forward PUFs with Two Intermediate Arbiters
ANN models for feed-forward overlap (Fig. 4.2(a)) and nested (Fig. 4.2(b)) configura-
tions are trained using multilayered perceptrons with one hidden layer. These models
were relatively more complex and required 80 neurons instead of 50 to reach good pre-
diction accuracies. The size of the training data required to attain 92% accuracy was
measured. The effect of changing the second FF loop output stage on this value is shown
in Fig. 4.4(a) and Fig. 4.4(b) for nested and overlap structures, respectively. It can be
noted that the observed values imply that the PUFs with 2 intermediate arbiters are
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Figure 4.3: Double-loop PUFs. Minimum number of CRPs required to predict with
92% accuracy vs. position of the FF loop output (N3). Each box represents 10 PUFs.
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more secure than double-loop PUFs. More importantly, similar to the previous case,
we can note that the output positions closer to other FF loop inputs/outputs require
relatively less training data.
4.6 Entropy of Challenge-Response Deviation Metric
Unpredictability of a PUF is a measure of complexity of the input output mapping
between inputs and ouputs of a predictive model. It is known that linear PUFs can
be easily learned [10] [11] [18]. So, the further the function of a FF-PUF deviates
from the function of a linear PUF, the harder it becomes to learn an accurate predictive
model. With this premise in mind, we propose an entropy based unpredictability metric
to estimate the effect of FF loop position for a given FF structure. The entropy of
challenge-response deviation metric is based on two terms: the entropy of the XOR-ed
challenge deviation and the entropy of the response deviation.
4.6.1 Definition
The first metric, δXdev, is based on comparing the input vector of a given FF-PUF (XFF )
to that of a linear PUF (Xlin) with same delay difference parameters. It is known
that a standard MUX PUF can be modeled as a linear function of cumulative XOR-ed
challenges (X) as described in (2.1). Assume a standard MUX PUF is converted to a
feed-forward PUF such that the intermediate output replaces the challenge-bit of stage
N2. For a given challenge, there are only two possible ways in which this conversion can
alter the values of a certain bit in X. Case-1: The intermediate arbiter output is same
as the challenge-bit at N2 and none of the XOR-ed challenge-bits is affected. Case-2:
The intermediate arbiter output is different from the challenge-bit. This leads to a more
complex mapping between the input vector X and the response, which makes it harder
to learn a predictive model.
Let us define a Bernoulli random variable Xdev that indicates whether a given input-
bit (Xi) deviates (flips) from its original value due to change in the structure from
linear to feed-forward. Entropy quantifies the degree of randomness in Xdev. For a
given challenge (C), the probability of deviation can be computed by using normalized
Hamming distance between Xlin and XFF , i.e., P
X
dev =
HD(Xlin,XFF )
N where N is the
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Figure 4.4: Nested and Overlap FF PUFs. Minimum number of CRPs required to
predict with 92% accuracy vs. position of the feed-forward loop output stage (N22).
Each box represents 10 PUFs.
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number of stages. The XOR-ed challenge deviation metric (δXdev) is defined as the mean
entropy of Xdev over a set of challenges. This can be expressed as
δXdev =
1
M
∑
C∈M
−PXdevlog2(PXdev)− (1− PXdev)log2(1− PXdev), (4.2)
whereM is a randomly chosen subset of challenges and M is the number of challenges.
Similarly, a metric can be defined to measure the dissimilarity between the response
signatures of a linear PUF and a FF-PUF. Define a Bernoulli random variable Rdev
which indicates whether or not the response of the FF-PUF is different from that of
the linear PUF for the same challenge. The probability of response changing can be
computed as PRdev =
HD(Rlin,RFF )
M where Rlin and RFF are the response signatures of
linear and FF-PUFs, respectively and M is the number of bits in the response signature.
The response deviation metric (δRdev) is then computed as the entropy of Rdev. This can
be expressed as
δRdev = −PRdevlog2(PRdev)− (1− PRdev)log2(1− PRdev), (4.3)
The unpredictability metric (δdev) is the average value of δ
X
dev and δ
R
dev, i.e., δdev =
δXdev+δ
R
dev
2 .
4.6.2 Results
All configurations evaluated for the security analysis are considered here. δdev is com-
puted for 100 instances for each of the double-loop, nested and overlap configurations.
The set M consists of 10,000 randomly chosen challenges. δdev plotted as a function
of varying FF loop output stage is presented in Fig. 4.5(a) for the case of double loop
PUFs. Fig. 4.5(b) depicts the results for nested and overlap configurations. Each value
is the mean of 100 instances. All the 100 instaces were observed to have similar values:
the variance of δdev for these 100 PUF instances is observed to be in the order of 10
−6.
In other words, the metric is invariant to the parameters of the PUF and only depends
on the design. It can be observed that δdev increases as the value of FF loop output
stage is increased upto a certain point and then starts decreasing as we get closer to
the final stage. The peak value is attained when the output position is chosen away
from the final stage and other inputs/outputs of FF loop(s). The inverted-U trend seen
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here roughly explains the results in Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4. Thus, this metric can be
used to estimate and compare the effect of changing FF loop positon on the security
of FF-PUFs. It is to be noted that this metric is limited to estimating and comparing
the unpredictability among different PUFs with same structure but varying FF loop
locations. It cannot be used to compare arbitrary FF-PUF structures and hence cannot
be considered as a universal metric for unpredictability of FF-PUFs.
4.7 Reliability Analysis
4.7.1 Effect of Changing FF Loop Output Location
For each configuration, i.e., for a given PUF design, 100 PUF instances are evaluated
using 1000 CRPs. The mean and standard deviation across the 100 PUF instances are
recorded. For double loop configurations, reliability as a function of feed-forward loop
output position is shown in Fig. 4.6(a). It can be seen that the reliability decreases as the
value of N1 or N2 is increased. The mean reliability decreases approximately linearly
as the second output stage (N2) is pushed further towards the right. The standard
deviation values were observed to be always less than 0.2%. Reliability values of nested
and overlap FF PUFs are shown in Fig. 4.6(b). The expected linearly decreasing trend
is observed again. This trend is in accordance with previous statistical analysis [7].
4.7.2 Soft-Response Thresholding
When the same challenge is applied to a PUF multiple times, it may not result in the
same output due to the effect of noise. As a consequence of the path delays in the circuit,
some challenges are more prone to generate an inconsistent response. By identifying
those challenges, we can increase the reliability during authentication. For a given
challenge, soft-response is defined as the probability that the response is 1 (Pr(R =
1)) under environmental variations. Empirically, the soft-responses were computed by
applying the same challenge 100 times under the presence of noise. As a convention, we
use 90% as a threshold to measure the consistency of a response. That is, if the response
is 0 or 1 in at at least 90% of the cases, it is considered a stable response. Otherwise,
it is referred to as an unstable response. Therefore if Pr(R = 1) is less than 10%, the
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Figure 4.5: δdev plotted as a function of varying FF loop output stage for double-loop,
nested and overlap configurations. The X-axis represents the position of the feed-forward
loop output stage. Each point is a mean value of 100 PUFs.
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response is considered a stable 0, and if it is greater than 90% it is considered a stable
1. If the value is between 10% and 90%, it is considered an unstable response. Soft-
responses of several FF PUFs were computed by assigning each challenge 100 times.
A subset of challenges was then chosen by thresholding the soft-responses using 90-10
thresholding. The challenges that generate stable responses are referred to as stable
challenges. Thus, stable challenges can be identified and used to increase reliability of
authentication.
4.7.3 Adding More FF Loops
We know that adding more loops and more internal arbiters adds complexity to the
PUF models making them more resistant to modeling attacks. But this comes at the
cost of degraded reliability. So, we extend the above reliability analysis to analyze
FF PUFs with more than 2 loops. FF PUFs with multiple loops and varying number
of intermediate arbiters were simulated in overlap and nested configurations and their
mean reliability values were computed. Further, soft-response thresholding is applied to
these configurations under different noise levels (5%, 10% and 15%) and the reliability
was computed before and after thresholding i.e., using 1000 randomly chosen challenges
and by using 1000 stable challenges. These results are presented in Tables 4.1-4.3.
In case of FF PUFs with a single intermediate arbiter, placing the FF loop outputs
closer to each other results in higher reliability compared to spreading them apart. In
spite of adding more loops, the change in reliability is not significant since the inter-
mediate response is generated by the same arbiter. Therefore, multiple intermediate
arbiters were used to generate independent intermediate responses. We know that mul-
tiple arbiters can be configured in overlap or nested fashion (see Fig. 4.2). In general,
it can be noticed that adding more loops makes the circuit more susceptible to noise
which leads to less reliability and less proportion of stable challenges. However, less
proportion of stable challenges is not directly a concern as the total number of avail-
able challenges is huge for arbiter PUFs and increases exponentially with the number
of stages. For 64-bit PUFs, assuming a meager 10% of the challenges are stable, the
server still has 1.8 × 106 trillion (10% of 264) stable challenges. For nested and over-
lap FF PUFs, the results show that reliability can be improved by replacing the FF
loops with modified FF loops. For example, FF PUF with 5 intermediate arbiters and
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5 loops in overlap configuration has 84.8% reliability (15% noise level). If the 5 loops
are replaced by modified FF loops, i.e, the same output is provided to two consecutive
stages, the reliability increases to 92%. These results also illustrate that soft-response
thresholding can significantly increase the reliability to more than 96% in every case.
Considering nested configuration with 5 loops, we can see that mean reliability is 81.6%
(15% noise) and 57% of the challenges are stable. By choosing these stable challenges
for authentication, reliability can be increased to 96.3%.
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion
An empirical analysis of the effect of loop positioning in FF PUFs on their and attack-
resistance and reliability is presented in this chapter. We show that location of the loop
can have significant effect on attack-resistance. In case of double loop PUFs, the number
of CRPs required by an attacker to train an accurate model can be increased from 15,000
(N2 = 25 and N3 = 26 - modified FF PUF) to 107,500 (N2 = 25 and N3 = 50), i.e.,
more than 7 times, by just changing the location of feed-forward loop output stage
(N3). Similar observations can be made for nested and overlap configurations. In
general, output stages for FF loops should be chosen away from the input stages and
other output stages to attain better security characteristics. We believe that FF PUFs
can be used as a better alternative to standard arbiter PUFs as components of an XOR
PUF since FF PUFs are inherently nonlinear and a linear approximation similar to
the cases of standard XOR PUFs or Interpose PUFs is not applicable [11] [33]. The
above observations can play an important role in appropriately choosing the design of
FF PUFs for better reliability and security.
We also propose an entropy based metric to determine the more secure FF loop
positions by comparing the inputs and outputs of a FF-PUF to that of a linear PUF.
This enables designers to enhance the security of FF-PUFs by choosing better locations
for input and output stages of FF loops without having to train attack models. The
drawbacks of this metric are that it is a rough estimate and also is limited to comparing
FF-PUFs with similar structures but different FF loop positions. Thus, it cannot be
considered as a universal unpredictability metric. The following conclusions can be
made regarding the reliability of FF PUFs. First, as FF output stage is chosen further
50
away, the value of reliability decreases. This can be attributed to the fact that FF loop
output has more impact on the final response as it is positioned closer the final stage.
Second, as more intermediate arbiters are added, the PUFs tend to be more susceptible
to noise in general. Third, replacing FF loops with modified FF loops can increase the
reliability. The loss of reliability can be addressed by identifying unstable challenges.
We show that applying soft-response thresholding can effectively increase the reliability
to more than 96%. Since this is based on simple thresholding, the added complexity is
negligible.
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Chapter 5
Feed-Forward XOR PUFs:
Attack-Resistance and Reliability
Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates XOR PUFs in terms of their resilience against attacks (security)
and their resilience against noise (reliability). Authors in [10, 11, 34, 35] have presented
methods to attack XOR PUFs using machine learning. One major issue with XOR
PUFs is that their models can be expressed as linear decision boundaries [11] which
makes it easier to learn an accurate model. Also, evolutionary strategy based attacks
were presented in [34, 36] which are based on the assumption that the structure of
each component PUF, i.e., the number of model parameters are known to the attacker.
A black-box approach is adopted to modeling XOR PUFs where the attacker does
not have any access to any side-channel information. Additionally, the existing studies
[10,11,34,35,37] are only limited to XOR PUFs with standard arbiter PUFs as elements,
called standard XOR PUFs. In this chapter, we simulate and analyze XOR PUFs with
FF PUFs as elements, called feed-forward XOR PUFs (FFXOR PUFs), and assess their
security and reliability in comparison with standard XOR PUFs. Since FF PUFs are
inherently nonlinear, a linear approximation similar to the cases of standard XOR PUFs
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Figure 5.1: XOR arbiter PUF. Each component could be either standard or FF PUF.
or Interpose PUFs [33] is not applicable. Artificial neural networks (ANNs) [24] are used
to learn the models and the security of a PUF is estimated in terms of the amount of
data an attacker requires to learn an accurate predictive model. It is important to
note that our work is limited to modeling attacks and does not focus on side-channel
attacks [38–40].
5.2 XOR Arbiter PUFs
To make arbiter PUFs less susceptible to modeling attacks, the idea of XORing outputs
of multiple arbiter PUFs to generate the final response was suggested in [12]. The
structure of an XOR PUF with l levels, i.e., with l MUX PUFs as elements is depicted in
Figure 5.1. The same n-bit challenge vector C is provided as input to all the component
n-stage arbiter PUFs. XORing the intermediate responses adds non-linearity to the
system making it more difficult to learn a model.
5.3 Setup
For security analysis, XOR PUFs and FFXOR PUFs with number of levels l = 2 to
l = 8 are simulated and their neural network models are trained. 32-stage MUX PUFs
were used as the components for each XOR PUF. FF PUFs containing a feed-forward
loop (see Figure 2.2) whose intermediate response is computed at the 15th stage (N1)
and is fed into the 25th stage (N2) were used as components of FFXOR PUFs. XOR
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PUFs with l ≥ 8 were found to be attack resistant. For each of these configurations,
data for 10 PUF instances were generated. For each instance, 1.2 million challenge-
response pairs (CRPs) are extracted. 1 million CRPs are used to train the model and
100,000 CRPs are used for testing and validation each.
For reliability analysis, noisy responses were generated by adding Gaussian noise
with varying standard deviation to the delay difference at each stage. As a result, the
distribution is modified to ∆i ∼ N (0, 1) +N (0, (σn)2). Here, σn denotes the standard
deviation of the noise. Once again, XOR PUFs with 2 levels to 8 levels were evaluated
for the reliability analysis. To emulate the effect of environmental and measurement
noise, Gaussian noise with zero mean and a standard deviation corresponding to 5%,
10% and 15% noise level is added to the delay difference parameters (∆i) at each stage
and to the arbiter delay (∆arb) [7,32]. Noise level is defined as the ratio of the standard
deviation of the noise to the standard deviation of delay differences at each stage. For
a given design configuration, 100 PUF instances were generated. 1000 randomly chosen
unique challenges are used to extract a 1000-bit response-vector for each instance. 100
noisy response vectors are generated for each of the 100 PUF instances for the purpose
of computing reliability. FFXOR PUFs with multiple loops were also analyzed.
5.4 Security Analysis
For every PUF instance, several models were trained by increasing the size of the training
set from 100k to 1M and the prediction accuracy on an independent test-set is reported.
The randomly chosen test challenges are kept consistent across all the models to have an
unbiased comparison. For configurations with standard arbiter PUFs as components,
mutlilayer perceptrons with 2 hidden layers were implemented with 60 and 30 neurons
in each hidden layer, respectively. Since ANNs with 2 hidden layers were unable to
accurately model FFXOR PUFs, 3 hidden layer structures with 120, 30 and 15 neurons,
respectively, were trained. The training and testing errors are compared for each model
to make sure that there is no over-training.
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5.4.1 Results
Prediction accuracies of standard arbiter XOR PUFs were evaluated by increasing the
size of the training set from 100,000 CRPs to 1 million CRPs. Figure 5.2(a) and Figure
5.2(b) show how prediction accuracies of attack models vary with respect to training size
for standard and FFXOR PUFs, respectively. The number of levels is varied from l = 2
to l = 8. As expected, the prediction accuracy increases with increase in the training
size and smaller XOR PUFs are easier to model as compared to higher number of XOR
inputs (say l = 7, 8). Each accuracy value is the median of 10 PUF instances. In case
of the standard XOR PUFs, it can be observed that for l = 2 to l = 7, models can be
trained with more than 95% accuracy. For l = 8, the model is stuck at 50% accuracy.
In case of FF PUFs, l = 2, 3, 4 achieve more than 90% accuracy while the models for
PUFs with l ≥ 5 are not as accurate. The maximum accuracy values attained using 1
million CRPs as a function of number of component PUFs in the circuit are presented
in Figure 5.3. The model accuracies of standard and feed-forward XOR PUFs can be
observed. Each value is presented in the form of a box-plot of 10 instances.
5.4.2 Discussion
It can be observed that FFXOR PUFs require significantly more resources to attack
as compared to standard XOR PUFs. This follows from the fact that the number of
ANN parameters required to train standard arbiter PUFs is 33× 60× 30× 1 = 59, 400
and for FF PUFs, it is 33 × 120 × 30 × 15 × 1 = 1, 782, 000. Note that the input
layer has 33 parameters, including the bias, since the input size is 32 bits. This costs
more computational resources and processing time for the attacker. This difference is
expected to be more significant when dealing with XOR PUFs with more than 128
or 256 bit-challenges. The results in Figure 5.3 show that the standard XOR PUFs
can be trained with more than 95% prediction accuracy up to 7 levels while FFXOR
PUFs with 5 levels only attain a maximum prediction accuracy of 80% and the models
for more than 5 levels are just as good as random guessing (50% accuracy). These
observations offer an important insight that more secure XOR PUFs that have much
less area overhead can be designed by replacing standard arbiter PUFs with FF PUFs
as elements. This is especially important as practical PUFs are expected to be lighter,
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Figure 5.2: Prediction accuracy vs. training size of ANN models for standard XOR
PUFs and FFXOR PUFs. The number levels is varied from l = 2 to l = 8. The FF
PUFs contain one loop from N1 = 15 to N2 = 25. The number of stages (N) is 32.
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Figure 5.3: Prediction accuracy vs. number of levels (l) for 32-stage standard XOR
PUFs and FFXOR PUFs. Accuracy values are presented as a box-plot of 10 instances.
i.e., have low hardware resources thus requiring less computations and lower power
consumption.
Logistic regression based attack strategies as shown in [41] are not valid for FFXOR
PUFs since the component PUFs are not linear. Even though we know that alternatives
such as evolutionary strategies or multi-layer perceptrons can be used to train FF PUFs,
it has been shown that training FF PUFs is much harder compared to training standard
arbiter PUFs [11,27]. For example, a 128-bit standard arbiter PUF requires 2.10 seconds
while a FF PUF requires 3:15 hours using evolutionary strategy [11]. In recent work
by Becker, it has been shown that XOR PUFs can be attacked by using evolutionary
strategies [34]. However, this method may not be applicable to attack FFXOR PUFs
unless the internal arbiter output locations are known to the attacker. The attacker
could potentially examine all possible FF loop positions and identify the design via
trial and error. But this requires a significant increase in the attack time. For FFXOR
PUFs composed of N-stage FF PUFs as components, there are N(N−1)2 possible FF loop
placements for one loop. Therefore, the number of machine learning runs increases by
496 times for 64 bits and 2016 times for 128 bits. In general, for FF PUFs with K loops,
it would increase by a factor of
(
N
K+1
)
. It is worth noting that reliability based machine
learning attacks have been shown to outperform other machine learning attacks on XOR
60
PUFs. This is because they utilize a divide-and-conquer approach which reduces the
number of model parameters from l(N +1) to N +1, for XOR PUFs with l components
of N -stages each. But, the divide-and-conquer approach used in reliability based attacks
is dependent on the fact that reliability of a response bit depends equally on each of the
component PUFs [34]. But this would not be the case if FF PUFs with non-identical
structures are used as components, making them more attack resistant. It has been
suggested in [40] that machine learning attacks on XOR PUFs can be made even harder
by using different challenges for each component PUF.
5.5 Reliability Analysis
5.5.1 FFXOR PUFs with Single-loop FF PUFs
Reliability of XOR PUFs up to 8 levels are computed by adding noise to each of the
32 stages in the component PUFs. The component PUFs are FF PUFs with a FF loop
placed between stages N1 = 10 and N2 = 20. For each case, i.e., for each value of l,
100 PUF instances with the same circuit design are simulated. For each instance, 100
noisy 1000-bit response signatures are generated. Intra-chip variation is computed (see
equation (4.1)) and the change in reliability with increase in the number of XOR levels
is shown in Figure 5.4. It can be observed that it decreases as the number of levels
increases and FFXOR PUFs have less reliability compared to standard XOR PUFs of
the same size (see Figure 5.4). Moreover, the reliability values of FFXOR PUFs drop
at a slightly higher rate with respect to the value of l. These values can be used to
extrapolate the trend to estimate how reliability scales with the increase in the number
of arbiter PUFs used. This demonstrates that reliability of XOR PUFs can be as low
as 60% (for l = 8). It has been shown in [7] that reliability of an N -stage FF PUF
depends on arctan(
√
N2−1
N−N2+1). We considered 64-bit feed-forward PUFs (N = 64) with
the intermediate output measured at the 10th stage (N1 = 10) and feeding into the 40th
stage (N2 = 40) and verified that they have similar reliability to 32-stage PUFs shown
in Figure 5.4 . Note that the value of arctan(
√
N2−1
N−N2+1) is equal to 0.88 and 0.895 for
the 32-bit and the 64-bit FF PUFs, respectively.
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Figure 5.4: Reliability vs. number of levels for 32-stage standard and FFXOR PUFs.
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Figure 5.5: Histogram of soft-responses of a 64-stage FFXOR PUF showing stable and
unstable responses. l = 8 and noise level = 10%.
5.5.2 Soft-response Thresholding
Soft-responses were defined in Chapter 3. For a given challenge, soft-response is defined
as the probability that the response is 1 (Pr(R = 1)) under environmental variations.
Empirically, the soft-responses were computed by applying the same challenge 100 times
under the presence of noise. As a convention, we use 90% as a threshold to measure
the consistency of a response. That is, if the response is 0 or 1 in 90% of the cases,
it is considered a stable response. Otherwise, it is referred to as an unstable response.
Therefore if Pr(R = 1) is less than 10%, the response is considered a stable 0, and if it
is greater than 90% it is considered a stable 1. If the value is between 10% and 90%, it
is considered an unstable response.
In case of XOR PUFs, a fundamental limitation is that a large portion of the chal-
lenges could lead to unstable responses, resulting in low reliability as illustrated in Figure
5.4. For a FFXOR PUF with 8 levels, the soft-response values associated with 20,000
challenges are shown in Figure 5.5. It can be observed that 25.9% of the responses
are stable. We know that soft-responses can be computed by repetitive measurement
of responses. Soft-responses of the 8-level FFXOR PUF were computed by assigning
each challenge 100 times. A subset of challenges were then chosen by thresholding the
soft-responses using 90-10 thresholding. The challenges that generate stable responses
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Figure 5.6: Reliability vs. number of levels(l) for 64-stage FFXOR PUFs before and
after thresholding. Threshold = 90%. N1 = 10, N2 = 40 and Noise level = 10%.
are referred to as stable challenges. Instead of using a set of 1000 randomly chosen chal-
lenges, 1000 stable challenges were used to compute the reliability. Reliability values
of a FFXOR PUF before and after thresholding are presented in Figure 5.6. It shows
that reliability of XOR PUFs during authentication can be significantly increased by
thresholding the soft-responses and identifying stable challenges. For example, the reli-
ability of an 8-level FFXOR PUF can be increased from 66% to 93.5%. The resultant
reliability achieved by thresholding depends on the value of the threshold used. If the
threshold is reduced the number of stable challenges will increase but this may cause a
degradation in reliability. The effect of varying the threshold value on the reliability of
8-level FFXOR PUFs is shown in Figure 5.7 for different noise levels.
5.5.3 FFXOR PUFs with Multi-loop FF PUFs
As a counter-measure to reliability of FF PUFs compared to standard arbiter PUFs, a
modified FF PUF (MFF PUF) structure was proposed in [7]. The idea is to have the
intermediate arbiter output feeding into two consecutive stages instead of one. FFXOR
PUFs with MFF PUFs as the components were simulated and their reliability was
computed. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to FFXOR PUFs consisting of FF
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Figure 5.7: Reliability of 8-level FFXOR PUFs after thresholding for different thresholds
and noise levels.
PUFs with multiple loops. Component FF PUFs where the output from an intermediate
stage is used as the challenge bit to multiple MUX stages were considered. The results
of reliability analysis of 8-level FFXOR PUFs up to 8 loops is presented in Tables 5.1. In
particular, the proportion of stable challenges and the reliability values computed before
and after thresholding are presented for various structures under different noise levels.
These values were computed using 90% threshold and each value is the median of 100
PUF instances. The results show that MFF PUFs can be used to attain reliability close
to standard XOR PUFs. In case of PUFs with one intermediate arbiter, having 1,3 or 5
loops results in less reliability compared to having even number of loops. The reliability
and the proportion of stable challenges can be substantially low, 53% (approx.) and
1-3%, respectively, when multiple intermediate arbiters are used. Two such examples
can be noticed in the Table. However, having MFF loops leads to better reliability.
The results confirm that the soft-response thresholding strategy can be employed to
significantly increase the reliability of response signatures to at least 89%. It is also
important to note that XOR PUFs have a huge set of challenges to choose from, i.e., 2N
challenges for N-bit PUFs. For 64-bit XOR PUFs, if we assume that a mere 1% of the
challenges are stable, the server still has 1.8× 105 trillion (1% of 264) stable challenges.
65
5.6 Conclusion
FFXOR PUFs are better alternatives to standard XOR PUFs, in terms of their attack-
resistance. Standard XOR PUF and FF XOR PUFs with 32-bit challenges, up to 8 XOR
levels are evaluated using multi-layer perceptrons and the results are compared. The
divide-and-conquer approach used in reliability based attacks is dependent on the fact
that reliability of a response bit depends equally on each of the component PUFs [34].
This would not be the case if the component PUFs are non-identical, i.e., these com-
ponents could be different FF PUF structures with different number of arbiters and
loops. The effect of number of XOR levels and the number of FF loops on the reliability
of FFXOR PUFs under different noise levels is presented and a soft-response thresh-
olding strategy is demonstrated as an effective counter-measure to degraded reliability.
Reliability values as low as 52% were increased to 89%.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Directions
Physical unclonable functions exploit intrinsic physical properties of integrated circuits
to enhance the security of devices by replacing or complimenting the traditional cryp-
tographic techniques. Their practical relevance has lead to a substantial rise in the
interest making PUFs a hot topic in the field of hardware security. A variety of PUFs
have been proposed in the literature starting from optical PUFs [2] and arbiter PUFs [3]
to the emerging nanotechnology based PUFs [42]. Even though this makes it difficult to
provide a formal unifying definition of PUFs, there are certain fundamental necessary
properties [5]. This thesis studies two such properties: unpredictability and reliability,
in the context of arbiter PUFs. Unpredictability is a relaxed form of unclonability, i.e.,
if one can predict the outcome of a PUF for a random challenge, only by observing a
set of CRPs, it is easy to build a mathematical clone. Reliability ensures consistency of
the responses for repeated evaluation of a challenge. We prove that the inherent physi-
cal parameters of standard arbiter PUFs, FF PUFs and MFF PUFs can be accurately
estimated and ANN models can be trained to predict their hard and soft-responses [27].
We show that these models can be used to choose reliable challenges for authentication.
We also provide important insights on the impact of FF PUFs’ design choices, i.e., the
number of loops and location of the loops, on their attack-resistance and reliability [43].
XOR PUFs were considered the most secure version of arbiter PUFs since the num-
ber of challenge-response pairs required by an attacker increases exponentially with the
number of component PUFs [11] [35]. But this observation was discredited later [34].
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To this end, we propose and evaluate FFXOR PUFs as a viable, potentially more se-
cure, alternative to the existing XOR PUFs [44]. We believe that state-of-the-art attack
methods like CMA-ES [34] are not directly applicable to FFXOR PUFs and also that
they can be made more resilient by using non-identical component PUFs such as a FF
PUFs with different designs. A drawback of our analysis is that the attack-resistance
evaluation is based only on ANNs and does not include side-channel attacks. Future
work can be focused on studying the security of FFXOR PUF using other attack strate-
gies. Even though FF XOR PUFs and some versions of MXPUFs [45] are shown to be
secure to some extent, it is known that silicon PUFs are still vulnerable to physical at-
tacks [40] such as photon emission analysis. Hence, the emerging area of nanotechnology
based PUFs can be an exciting new direction for PUFs [42].
An entropy based metric was presented in Chapter 3 but it is specific to the PUF
configurations considered. There has been some effort to formalize security evaluation of
PUFs theoretically in the past [26] [46] [47]. However, the metrics are either insufficient
or specific to a certain type of PUF and hence cannot be generalized. A universal
theoretical metric or model to estimate unpredictability can be very useful to compare
the security of different PUFs without undergoing an attack process.
Several solutions have been proposed to increase the reliability of PUFs using error-
correcting codes [48]. However they either incur large area and computational costs [49]
or leak security information [50] [51]. In this work, we demonstrate that soft-response
thresholding is a simple yet effective counter-measure to the degraded reliability of FF
and FFXOR PUFs. The limitation of this approach is that in some cases, a large
number of measurements might be required for a single authentication.
This thesis provides interesting insights on security and reliability of arbiter PUFs.
However, the task of realizing secure and reliable PUFs with low energy and area over-
head is still an active research challenge.
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